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Trend of pay for performance has increased since last few years but still it is a controversial argument if CEO compensation 
actually increases the firm performance. Prior studies argue that performance based CEO compensation increase the potential 
risk of the firm, which could further affect the long-term firm negatively. This study attempts to illustrate the impact of CEO 
compensation on firm performance along with the moderating role of risk-taking among these variables. Using hierarchical 
linear regression,  the results shows the significant negative impact of CEO compensation on operating performance which 
could be due to the high managerial power, cronyism, rent extraction or weak corporate governance. Nevertheless, the study 
revealed significant positive impact of CEO compensation on market performance but solely this determinant cannot be relied 
as a strong predictor of market performance due to lesser effect size of the model. Additionally, this study does not find any 
moderating role of risk-taking between CEO compensation and firm performance.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The acceptance of Modern Corporation as highlighted 
by Berle and Means1 marked a new era in managing 
business where owners do not manage the business himself 
but rather by hiring professional managers to do the job1. 
Until today, despite of several available studies in this area, 
conflicts between shareholders and CEOs is controversial 
and a debatable issue among academicians. A cast of 
qualms on the CEOs integrity has been on the rise 
researchers observed the CEOs chasing their self-interest 
and rent extraction rather than fulfilling their duty in 
maximizing shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, criticism in 
this perspectives can be observed through a wide range of 
studies2-3. Earlier study4 suggest that when there is very 
little or no ownership by CEOs then it will escalate agency 
costs and subsequently reduce the firm value. Nevertheless, 
Jensen and Meckling in their seminal paper proposed 
equity-based compensation to align the interest of CEOs 
with those of the shareholders5. Moreover, it is argued that 
executives try to increase the stock returns to gain their 
wealth if there is equity-based compensation6. 
Consequently, the behavior of rent extraction or empire 
building of executives would  diminished and works in the 
best interest of shareholders to increase their wealth and his 
own via firm’ stock performance.  
Nevertheless, several doubts regarding these 
compensation plans has also been recognized in the studies 
as it is observed that executive pay arrangements were also 
one of the prominent cause leading to financial crises. 
Unfortunately, despite of paying incentives to avoid 
excessive risk-taking, compensation plans were designed 
which promote excessive risk-taking especially in financial 
firms. In addition, these pay plans focused enough on 
aligning both equity and bonus compensation with short-
term shareholder value7. 
Misalignment of executive compensation with long-
term shareholder value could leads to creative risk-taking. 
Therefore, researchers suggested that reforming inefficient 
pay packages and enhancing shareholders rights by 
aligning long-term firm value with compensation could 
control this incongruous risk-taking behavior8. 
Although, there are abundance of literature regarding pay-
performance sensitivity or alignment of CEO 
compensation with firm performance9-10, this study has 
opted the model (see Figure 1) proposed by Yahya and 
Ghazali11 in their conceptual review to empirically test its 
validity on the financial sector of Pakistan.  
 
Fig.1. The Moderating Role of Risk-taking between CEO 
Compensation and Firm Performance 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES  
Researchers questioned why CEOs are being paid even 
after losing the shareholder value12. During the financial 
crisis of 2007 to 2008, excessive compensation of CEO 
was one of the central point of condemnation. Pertaining to 
pre and post crises, Yang, Dolar and Mo examined the 
effects of financial crises on the association between firm 
performance and CEO compensation and found a mixed 





Based upon agency theory and managerial power 
theory, Tien, Chen and Chuang revealed that CEO pay has 
a positive impact on international performance and return 
on asset, however, negative impact on the market value of 
the firm18. In the same lines, a previous study revealed that 
the firms who pay their CEOs a higher compensation also 
experience high operating performance as well as high 
returns as compared to the other firms14. In contrast, many 
researchers also purported that high CEO compensation 
induce over-confident behavior in CEOs. Over confident 
CEOs do not work all the time in the best interest of the 
shareholders rather they get involved in empire building 
and wasteful capital expenditures15-16. Consequently, 
Cooper, Gulen and Rau found negative relationship 
between CEO compensation and firm’ future returns due 
of over confident behavior of CEOs17.  
Moreover, CEOs should be paid a reasonable lucrative 
compensation if they also simultaneously enhance the 
firm’s market performance. Ang, Lauterbach and Vu 
supported the evidence that although high quality CEOs 
receive a high compensation but they are also able to grow 
the firm’ market value instantaneously23. On the other side 
of the coin, Core et al. criticized excessive CEO’ 
compensation as it is associated with negative market 
performance19. Align with the criticism, Barak, Cohen and 
Lauterbach in their study of 122 Israeli companies also 
revealed that CEOs having excessive remuneration effect 
the market value of the firm at the expense of small public 
investors19. 
However, most studies previously conducted in the 
Pakistani financial sector found no relationship between 
CEO compensation and firm performance20-21. Therefore, 
this study is pursuing slightly different perspective given 
that after the Code of Corporate Governance (2012) it is 
expected that the results could be quite different as 
compared to previous studies because they considered the 
data before the implication of Corporate Governance Act 
in Pakistan. Thus, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H1: CEO compensation has a positive impact on operating 
performance 
H2: CEO compensation has a positive impact on market 
performance 
 
Different risk preferences between principal and agent 
are also a reason for agency conflicts22. Therefore, to 
maintain their reputation and integrity in the company, 
most of the times CEOs avoid risky investment. Hence, to 
transform the risk-averse attitude of CEOs, the managerial 
risk-shifting hypothesis suggested that option grants in the 
compensation plans of CEOs could encourage them to take 
more acceptable risk23. Although, these types of 
compensation practices intended to align the interest of 
shareholders with CEOs but it also comes with very high 
risk, which could affect the long-term performance of the 
firm negatively24. 
Additionally, it is also associated to financial or 
accounting fraud as executives try to justify losses with 
good risky projects25. On that account, this study is 
interested to know if risk-taking could affect the 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm 
performance. Accordingly, the hypotheses are formulated 
in the following way: 
H3: Risk-taking moderates the relationship between CEO 
compensation and operating performance 
H4: Risk-taking moderates the relationship between CEO 
compensation and market performance 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1 Population and Sample 
In this study, the entire financial sector of Pakistan 
listed in Karachi Stock Exchange in Pakistan has been 
taken under investigation to fulfill the study objectives. 
There are five major financial sectors in Pakistan, i.e. 
commercial banks, investment banks, insurance 
companies, leasing companies and Modaraba firms. 
Moreover, there are total 95 financial companies/banks in 
total which are listed in KSE but the data of only 66 
companies/banks from the year 2010 to 2014 are 
accessible.  
3.2 Definition of the Variables  
Operating Performance: This study has measured 
operating performance through operating margin and 
measured through operating income divided by net sales. 
Market Performance: Price to earnings ratio (P/E) 
has been utilized to measure the market performance. It can 
be calculated simply by market value of share divided by 
earning per share.  
CEO Compensation: This variable has been measured 
through the total remuneration paid to CEO annually 
including basic salary, bonus, medical allowance, 
maintenance etc.  
Risk-taking: Owing to firm’s risk taking, systematic 
risk may increase32 and measure risk-taking is calculated 
through Beta.  
3.3 Model 
There are two operational models designed to 
accomplish the study. In first model, operating 
performance is criterion variable though in the second 
model, the dependent variable is market performance. 
Following are the OLS models which are formulated to test 
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OPit = a0 + β1 CEOit + β2 RTit + β3 RTCEOit + eit ….. (1)  
MPit = a0 + β1 CEOit + β2 RTit + β3 RTCEOit + eit ….. (2)  
OPit= Operating Performance in time by annually data 
MPit= Market Performance in time by annually data 
CEOit= CEO compensation in time by annually data 
RTit= Risk-taking in time by annually data 
RTCEOit= Interaction for CEO comp. with risk-taking. 
3.4 Descriptive  
As shown in Table 1, the operating performance of 
financial sector in Pakistan is demonstrating negative ROS, 
which means that on average the financial sector is within 
deficit phase. Nevertheless, the market performance is 
positive (P/E is almost 12.17). Moreover, the average CEO 
compensation is almost 27 million Rs., the minimum value 
is 0 which means some companies have not paid any 
remuneration to their CEOs if the company is facing loss.  
 
Table.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
 Stat.  Stat.  Stat.  Stat.  Stat.
Opt. Perf. 330 -98.93 20.48 -.191 6.240
Mkt. Perf. 330 -160.15 957.35 12.165 60.836
CEO Comp. 330 .00 277516.0 26571.67 36540.09
Risk-taking 330 -2.29 5.61 .839 .840
N (listwise) 330   
 
Table.1. Descriptive Statistics (continue) 
 N Skewness Kurtosis
 Stat.  Stat.  Std. Error Statistic Std. Error
Opt. Perf. 330 -12.655 .134 194.514 .268
Mkt. Perf. 330 11.816 .134 179.458 .268
CEO Comp. 330 3.013 .134 12.674 .268
Risk-taking 330 .580 .134 4.584 .268
N (listwise) 330   
 
The last variable is risk-taking which has been measured 
by beta. As the value is between 0 and 1 so it can be 
purported that there is low-volatility in the financial sector 
of Pakistan. Nonetheless, the Skewness and Kurtosis 
columns in Table 1 exhibits that the data is not normal due 
to extreme values so data cleaning and validity is required 
before analyzing using Hierarchical Linear Regression.   
3.5 Data Cleaning and Validity  
A new variable has been computed by multiplying z-scores 
of CEO compensation and risk-taking to create the 
moderating variable. Owing to the negative values in the 
data, “POWER” function through MS Excel has been used 
and then through Box-Cox power transformation 
techniques the data has been transformed with Lambda 
0.05 for all variables. Potential outliers from the data were 
detected through Mahalanobis distance. Although, there 
were 330 total observations but after excluding outliers 
observations were reduced in both models (N1=286, 
N2=260).  
The normality of the data has been assured through 
histogram and autocorrelation through Durbin-Watson test. 
It has been previously established that the value of Durbin-
Watson close to 2 represents no autocorrelation. According 
to table 2 and table 3, both models indicate that the Durbin-
Watson values are close to 2 (D1=1.9, D2=2.2). CEO 
compensation, risk taking and the moderating variable of 
risk-taking are contributing only 3.6 percent in operating 
performance and 5.8 percent in market performance.  
 
Table.2.Operating Performance: Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square 




1 .189a .036 .026 .09382 1.901
a. Predictors: (Constant), CEORisk, Risk-taking, CEO Comp. 
b. Dependent Variable: Operating Performance 
 
Table.3.Market Performance: Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square 




1 .242a .058 .047 .10098 2.154
a. Predictors: (Constant), CEOrisk, Risk-taking, CEO Comp. 
b. Dependent Variable: Market Performance 
 
Significance of the models and linearity has been 
validated through ANOVA tables; F1 (3, 282) = 3.486, 
p=0.016 and F2 (3, 256), p=0.001. In addition, VIF and 
tolerance values are taken under consideration to find any 
issue of Multicollinearity. VIF values for both models are 
below 10 and tolerance values are about 0.1 so it can be 
validated that there is no issue of Multicollinearity among 
the variables (see 4 and 5) 3.6 percent in operating 
performance and 5.8 percent in market performance.  
Significance of the models and linearity has been 
validated through ANOVA tables; F1 (3, 282) = 3.486, 
p=0.016 and F2 (3, 256), p=0.001. In addition, VIF and 
tolerance values are taken under consideration to find any 
issue of Multicollinearity. VIF values for both models are 
below 10 and tolerance values are about 0.1 so it can be 
validated that there is no issue of Multicollinearity among 
the variables (see 4 and 5).  
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Table 4 exhibits significant negative impact of CEO 
compensation on operating performance (β1= -2.634, p= 
0.001). However, risk taking has no impact on operating 
performance (β2=0.028, p=0.706) and it does not 
moderates the relationship between CEO compensation 
and operating performance (β3=0.019, p=0.799). 
Consequently, the results accept H1 but reject H3. Table 5 
illustrates the coefficients for second model in which 
criterion variable is market performance. The table reveals 
that there is significant positive impact of CEO 
compensation on market performance (β1=2.102, p=0.024). 
 

















(Constant) 3.795 .900  4.215 .000  
CEO 
Comp. 
-2.634 .821 -.194 -3.207 .001 .933 1.072
Risk-
taking 
.028 .074 .023 .377 .706 .934 1.070
RTCEO .019 .074 .015 .254 .799 .978 1.023
a. Dependent Variable: Operating Performance 
 














(Constant) -.897 1.017  -.882 .378  
CEO 
Comp. 
2.102 .927 .142 2.268 .024 .942 1.061
Risk-
taking 
-.342 .101 -.209 -3.385 .001 .962 1.040
RTCEO .100 .090 .069 1.120 .264 .972 1.029
a. Dependent Variable: Market Performance 
 
In addition, inconsistent with prior model, risk-taking 
has a significant negative impact on market performance 
(β2=-0.0342, p=0.001). Nevertheless, this model also does 
not find any moderating effect of risk-taking between CEO 
compensation and market performance (β3=0.100, 
p=0.972). Therefore, H2 has been accepted but the results 
reject the H4.  
As there is negative impact of CEO compensation on 
operating performance so there is an indication of agency 
conflicts in financial sector of Pakistan. Previously, Core et 
al. also found that there is negative relationship between 
CEO compensation and firm performance19. Their reason 
for that inverse relationship was weaker corporate 
governance. Nonetheless, corporate governance structures 
in Pakistan has been improved after the implications of 
SECP’s revised Code of Corporate Governance (2012) as 
most of the studies found positive impact of corporate 
governance on firm performance in Pakistan33. However, 
these results put a question mark on the efficiency of the 
code. 
Reason for the negative impact of operating 
performance cannot be fully authenticated. However, a 
previous study revealed that the negative association 
between CEO compensation and firm performance could 
be due to cronyism by directors and CEOs34. Younas, 
Mehmood, Ilyas and Bajwa also purported that firm 
performance is negatively associated to CEO 
compensation in Pakistani firms which holds managerial 
power theory35. Therefore, it can be assumed that the issue 
of managerial power and rent extraction persists in 
financial sector of Pakistan and CEOs could have 
substantial influence over setting their remuneration.  
Although there is a negative impact of CEO 
compensation on operating performance but the results 
reveal positive impact of CEO compensation on firm 
performance. This outcome is consistent with the results of 
Deysel and Kruger24. Nevertheless, the effect size of the 
model is much lower so the increase in market performance 
of financial sector in Pakistan cannot be solely relied on 
this predictor. Market performance and equity returns 
fluctuates with unobservable and exogenous economic 
events so CEO’s decisions are less effective in this case36. 
Therefore, CEOs should be held more accountable for 
accounting or operating measures.  
The study also discovered that risk-taking has a 
significant negative impact on market performance. It can 
be purported that poor decisions of CEOs are affecting the 
market performance. However, this study does not 
authenticates that this negative relationship is due to the 
greed of CEOs to increase their compensation as the results 
do not find any moderating role of risk-taking between 
CEO compensation and market performance. In addition, 
no moderating influence of risk-taking has been found on 
the relationship between CEO compensation and operating 
performance. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION  
Immense literatures are found where researchers tried 
to align the CEO compensation with different accounting 
and market based indicators. Nevertheless, just aligning 
their compensation with firm performance is not enough, it 
should have sound effect on firm performance. Therefore, 
this study attempts to find the impact of CEO 
compensation on operating and market performance. The 
results revealed that there is a negative impact of CEO 
compensation on operating performance which is 
supporting managerial power hypothesis in this 
perspective. Nevertheless, this inverse relation could be 
due to many reasons, e.g. cronyism, rent extraction or weak 
corporate governance.  
On the other hand, positive significant impact of CEO 
compensation on market performance has been found. 
Owing to the weak effect size of the model, the positive 
trend in market performance cannot be relied exclusively 
on CEO compensation as there could be many other 
exogenous factors that are determining the market 
performance. Therefore, it is recommended that futuristic 
researchers should also consider different control variables 
(corporate governance mechanisms, economic variables 
etc.) to improve the model’s goodness of fit. The model 
also demonstrated that there is a negative significant effect 
of risk-taking on market performance. Usually, it is 
observed that efficient risk-taking effect the performance 
positively though excessive and unproductive risk-taking 
could negatively affect the performance. However, it is not 
clear that negative impact of risk-taking on market 
performance is owing to the CEOs’ gluttony to enhance 
their incentives by taking excessive risk as the study do not 
find any moderating role of risk-taking between CEO 
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compensation and firm performance (operating and market 
performance). It is recommended that there is a need of 
further study on this perspective which could be conducted 
on different markets and different sectors.   
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